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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
JOHN CHRISTY and KATHRYN 
E. CHRISTY, Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
EDWARD L. GUILD and MABEL 
C. GUILD, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants and Appellanbs 
Appeal From Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Hon. Oscar W- McConkie, Judge 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATE~IENT 
This is a suit for restitution of the premises de-
scribed in the complaint, brought under the pro-
visions of the unla\vfnl detainer statute. It is 
alleged in the com·plaint that on or about the 24th 
day of January, 1935 the plaintiffs ngreed to sel1 
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to the defendants certain real estate particularly 
described, for the sum of $3200. Among. other 
things the contract provided that the defendants 
were to build certain improvements consisting of 
a front porch built out of firebrick on a concrete 
foundation and the remodeling of the rear by a.ppli 
cation of plaster and California stucco. The con-
tract provided for $30 monthly payments and it \vas 
alleged that the defendants have failed to make the 
monthly payments and that on the 30th day of 
April, 1940 the defendants were delinquent on 
account of monthly p~ayments in the sum of ·$130 
and were delinquent in the payment of taxes and 
insurance, aggregating $297.20. 
It was alleged that although on April 30, 1940 the 
plaintiffs caused to be served on the defendants a 
notice in writing terminating the contract and had 
on May 6, 1940 served on the defendants a notice 
demanding delivery of the premises to the plain-
tiffs, the defendants had nevertheless failed and 
refused to deliver possession. The prayer was 
for restitution of the premises and damages for 
the rents and profits at the rate of $75~00 per 
month. The complaint was amended by attaching 
the sales agreement, Exhibit A, in evidence. (Ab. 
1-8). 
The defendants answered, admitting the execution 
and delivery of the contract of sale described, ad-
mitting that they had ·agreed to make certain im-
provements and alleging that the defendants had 
made improvements on the property to the approx-
imate cost and value of $2,000~ and that the plain-
tiffs had, after execution of the contract, con-
sidered the imp-rovements sp·ecified in the contract 
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to be undesirable and had \Yaived the provisions of 
the contract with respect thereto. 
The defendants further alleged that sinee the date 
of the contract, they had made 49 pa)i1nents on the 
contract aggregating $1647.67, and that on the 21st 
day of November, 1939 the parties had made a con1-
putation of all payments which had then 1nature<l 
and all charges of every character and had de-
termined that there wa.s due on back interest and 
taxes, including the 1938 taxes, and on lumber pur-
chased and used in making improvements upon the 
said building, the sum of $485.82 and that defend-
ants had delivered to the plaintiff their negotiable 
promis8ory note for the said sum, payable in install-
ments of $35 per month. 
It is further alleged in the answer, that on the 31st 
day of March, 1940, the defendants paid to the 
plaintiffs the sum of $80 on the contract and beforP. 
the institution of suit they tendered to plaintiffs 
the total amount due upon the contract, exciusivo 
of the said note, to wit: $130. That they have kept 
said tender good and rio"' offer to make the pay-
ments on the contract to the clerk of the court and 
to fully comply 'vith the terms·· -and conditions 
thereof. ~\11 other n1aterial allegations of the con1-
plaint are denied. 
The case was tried before a jury, evidence was 
adduced by the plaintiffs and defendants as to the 
payments made, as to the circumstances surround-. 
ing the execution and delivery of the promissory 
·note, Exhibit 2, dated November 21, 1939, and as 
to the improvements referred to in the eontract. 
The evidence was in conflict as to the waiver of the 
contraet requirements regarding the building of 
the front porch and stuccoing of the rear. The 
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defendants offered proof to the effect that they 
had, since the execution of the contract, improved 
the property to the extent of $2,000. An objection 
to this offer 'vas sustained by the court. 
When both parties rested, the plaintiffs moved to 
strike all of the testimony of the defendants relat· 
ing to the waiver of the requirements in the con· 
tract for the construction of a front porch and the 
stuccoing of the rear of the building, and moved 
the court to direct the jury to find in favor of the 
plaintiffs and against the defendants as prayed in 
the complaint. · 
After hearing argument on the motion, the court 
stated that he would direct a verdict for the plain· 
tiffs, but that he would give the defendants an 
opportunity to protect their investment by paying 
the full balance on the contract, together ""with $300 
attorney's fees, and court costs, which would not 
1exceed $35. (A b. 28-30). 
The court stated that he would hold up the entry of 
any judgment for a p.eriod of one week, if the de· 
fendants agreed during that period, to attemp~t to 
get the money. During the ensuing week, a.s shown 
by the colloquy between court and counsel, the de-
fendants endeavored to raise the necessary money 
but fell short of getting the required amount. The 
court thereupon granted the plaintiffs' motion to 
Etrike all testimony respecting the agreement to the 
effect that the front porch need not he constructed 
nor the back porch repaired by the application of 
stucco and granted the plaintiffs' motion for a 
directed verdict. (Ab. 32), · 
A judgment "ras entered on the verdict, providing 
for the recovery of the possession of the real estate 
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5. 
and th(l recovery of $-t-1~.50, representing treble 
damages. (Ab. 34-35). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Defendants assigned as error the sustaining of 
objections to the following question: 
''About ho'v much money did you spend on 
making the improvements on the inside~'' 
and in sustaining objections to the following ques-
tion: 
"I will ask you to state whether or not an 
offer to make ace-ruing installment pay-
Inents on the contract 'vas made, and if so, 
\\?hat the offer was~'' 
·rhe court erred in making and entering an order ' 
striking all evidence from the record relating to 
the modification of the contract by oral agreement 
and conduct. .(I, III). 
The court erred in directing the jury to return a 
verdict for the plaintiffs. (I\T, VI). 
The court erred in l.mposing a condition on the de .. 
fendants that they pay in addition to the amount 
due on the contract, $300 attorney's fees and court 
costs not exceeding $35, and in limiting the time 
in which the defendants were required to make 
such payments. (V). 
'rhe court erred in considering the equitable issues 
and in holding as a matter of law that the notice 
of forfeiture "\Vas reasonable and sufficient. (VIII, 
IX). 
The court erred in making and enterin2' Judgment. 
(\
7 II, X, XI)~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
ARGUMENT 
'rhe assignments of error will he argued under the 
following headings : 
1. The/ court erred in directing a verdict 
for the phiintiffs and in making and enter-
ing judgment thereon. (Assign. 4, 6, 7, 9, 
10 and 11). 
2. The court erred in ruling on the evi-
dence. (Assign. 1-3). 
3. The court erred in failing and refusing 
to consider equitable issues. (Assign. 5 
and 8). 
The pleadings disclose issues upon the following 
questions: 
(1) The amount delinquent on the con-
tract when suit was brought; 
( 2:) Whether the contract provisiOIIls 
which required the defendants to make 
improvements had been waived; 
( 3) Whether the contract ;J,s modified had 
been substantially performed by the de-
fendants; 
( 4) Whether strict p~erformance of the 
contract by the defendants had been 
waived: 
(5) Whether the notice, Exhibit A, was 
sufficient to terminate the contract, and 
( 6) Whether in equity the court should 
declare a forfeiture of a contract for tne 
purchase of a house and lot upon which 
more than one-third of the principal amount 
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h~1s been paid and \Yhere $2,000 in valuable 
ilnproYenH:>nts have been placed on the 
property. 
Some of the issues were undoubtedy legal issues 
\Yhich should haYe been submitted to the jury and 
some were equitable issues for the deterrnination 
of the court. 1.'his action is for the recovery of 
specific real property with damages, and falls 
squarely "~i thin the provisions of 
Section 104-23-5 of the R-evised Statutes of 
lTtah, 193~. 
l t provides ~ 
"In actions for the recovery of specific real 
or personal property, writh or without dam-
ages, or for money claimed as due upon 
contract or as damages for breach of con-
tract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may 
be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is .. 
waived or a referenee is ordered as pro-
vided in this code. Where in these cases 
there are issues both of la"r and fact, the 
issue of law must first be disposed of. In 
other cases issues of fact must be tried by 
the court, subject to its power to order any 
such issue to be tried by a jury or referred 
to a referee as provided in this code.'' 
It has been held by this Court that where a case 
involves both lPgal and equitable issues, the ·court 
should decide the equitable issues and submit the 
questions of f9.ct to the jury. 
Park v. Wilkinson, 21 Utah 279; 60 P. 945. 
It is well settled that '\vhere there is substantia.] 
evidence both 'vays on a material question of fact, 
it is error for the trial court to direct a. verdict 
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Iverson v. Carrington, 60 Utah 79; 206 P. 
707. 
2 Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies, 
Section 1442, p. 1908 et seq. 
For the purpose of arguing the error of the court 
in directing a verdict for the plaintiffs, let us for 
the time being disregard the equitable issues. To 
make a case, the plaintiffs must show a default by 
the purchasers for which the contract could, under 
its terms, be forfeited. The defaults relied upon 
are set out in the notice, Exhibit A, which is by 
reference, made a part of the con1plaint. They are: 
(1) Failure to pay monthly p·ayment~ 
totalling $130. 
( 2) Failure to pay taxes and Insurance 
. totalling $297.20. 
(3) Failure to make specified imp-rove-
ments. 
Since the suit is based upon these defaults, the 
questions as to 'vhether defendants are guilty of 
the defaults charged were material. We shall dis· 
cuss the evidence as to these items in the order 
mentioned. 
The evidence disclosed that $130 ,~vas tendered to 
the plaintiffs May 20, 1940. (Ab. 19-~0). rl'he 
notice does not call for payment of additional in· 
stallments. The defendants offered to pay all in· 
stallment payments called for by the notice before 
suit 'vas brought. They testified further that the:y 
made a payment of $80 on March 31, 1940. Ot.her 
payments made after January, 1940, "\\Tere as fol 
lows:· 
$70.00 payment on the note February 14, 
1940, (Ex. 3) ; $88.15, February 14, 1940, 
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(_Ex. E); $19.00 ~,ebtuary, 1940, (-.:\.b. 17 ~ 
l~), and $40.00 Thlarch, 1940, (Ah. 17). 
1\Irs. Christy tPstified that if another payment ot 
some $~5 \Yas made earlier in l\_l arch in Salt Lake 
City, it \Vould be on the contract. 
The application of payments upon specific months 
is not made on the contract. From the beginning, 
it will be noted by exa1nination of Exhibit 1, pa.y-
lnents made at irregular intervals, were credited 
upon the total purchase price. So, under the evi· 
dence, there is no support for the contention of the 
plaintiffs that the delinquencies covered the months 
from December to April. They did not. rrhe 
alleged delinquencies of $130 covered the en tire 
period from the date of the contract, Jan~ary 24, 
1935, to :i\Iarch 31, 1940. As observed above, the 
'last payment of $80 was made on March 31, 1940. 
It is well settled that the acceptance of late and 
irregular payments on a real estate contract, which 
provides for monthly installment payments, vvaives 
the provision in the contract to the effect that 
time is of the essence and waives the right of the 
sellers to forfeit the contract without a timely and 
reasona bl0 notice. 
Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417; 34 P. (2d) 
699. 
What is a timely and reasonable notice is a ques· 
tion of fact fnr the jury. 
66 C. J. 724, Note 87. 
\V-illiarnson Heater Co. v. Whitmer, 183 
N. W. 404; 191 Iowa 1115. 
By accepting the $80 payment on March 31, 1940, 
the sellers waived the right to terminate the con-
tract for failure to pay the March payinent ·of $30 
and the April 1st p·ayment -of $30, there being no 
agreement as to whether the $80 payment was to 
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cover old delinquencies on the contract or current 
monthly payments. $80 would pay for two and 
two-thirds mo:Qths. 'rhe notice of forfeiture was 
served before the May payment fell due. The 
question of intent of the p·arties as to application 
of payments was one for the jury. 
The second issue, the delinquent taxes and insur-
ance, involves the note, Exhibit 2. Although it 
\vas at first hotly denied by Mrs. Christy, one 
of the plaintiffs, that the note had anything to do 
'vith the contract of purchase, it was finally ad-
mitted that the notations in ink on page 2 of the 
note covered the delinquent taxes and insurance 
and other items and that they were placed on the 
note before it wa~ signed and delivered. (Ab. 14) . 
. ~1\lthough the note states that it was for money 
·uoaned, and that it has no eonnection with the con-
tract of purchase, the notations on both the first 
and second pages clearly indicate the contrary and 
they are obviously part of the agreement. The 
evide-nce shows payments which were appliPd on 
the note. Mr. Guild testified that he had paid 
approximately $95 on the note. (Ab~ 20). 
The evidence is in conflict as to whether the notP 
\vas given and accepted as payment of the de .. 
Jinquent taxes and insurance. If the note was givev 
as payment of the delinquent ta..-xes and insurance. 
there was no default under the contract and thf' 
court erred in directing a verdict for failure to pay 
the items of delinquent taxes and insurance when 
due. The question as to 'vhether the note was given 
, ~as payment of an installment or as additional secur-
ity was a question for the jury. 
Rathke v. Dexter Horton Bank, 161 Wash. 
434. 297 P. 181. -
' If the note was not given in payment it was cei· 
tainly a written modification of the contract as to 
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the time of payn1ent of the delinquent taxes and in-
surance. The contract contained no provision to 
the effect that if the $35 monthly installment pay· 
ments were not 1nade "Then due, that the holder of 
the note, whoever it might be, could declare a ror-
feiture of the real estate contract. In the case of 
Spedden v. Sykes, 98 P. 752, 754, 
the Court said: 
''But "rhere, not only under the contract, 
but by subsequent agreen1ent of the par-
ties, notes are given for the payment of 
the purchase price \vhich, in the absence 
of any agreement to the contrary, would 
extend the time of payment over the period 
of limitation fixed by the statute for re-
covery upon overdue contracts, thus elim-
inating the implication or express under-
standing, as the case may be, that time is 
the essence of the contract, a more difficult 
question is p~resented, for it is upon this 
theory that forfeitures are sustained. 1 
Pomeroy's Equity, Para.. 445; Clark v. 
Lyons, 24 Ill. 105; Shater v. Niver, 9 Mich. 
253; Linscott v. Buck, 33 Me. 530 . . . '' 
''This Court has held the g1eneral doctrine 
that forfeitures are not favored in the law, 
and that courts should promptly seize upon 
any circun18tance arising out of the con-
tract or relations of the parties that would 
indicate an election or an agreement to 
waive the harsh and at times unjust remedy 
of forfeiture, a remedy which is oftentimes 
too freely granted by those who have taken 
no account of the misfortunes and dis-
appointments 'vhich conditions, unforseen 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
and beyond a party's control, have raised 
as a bar to performance, however honest 
may he his intent. Whiting v. D-oughton, 
31 Wash. 327; 71 P. 1026. Equity will en-
force forfeitures when it is the contract of 
the parties that it shall be so. But before 
rnaking its decree it will consider every 
agreement, every declaration, and every re-
lation of the parties arising out of the con-
tract ; and, if there be anything that war-
rants a finding that the p~arties have re-
solved anew, it will so decree.'' 
It was error for the court to refuse to submit to 
the jury the issue of fact as to the intention of the 
parties with respect to the note, Exhibit 2. 
Another issue of fact, which should have been sub-
mitted to the jury, concerns the alleged default in 
making the improvements. There is testimony by 
both Mr. and Mrs. Guild that the plaintiffs knew 
that the front porch had not been built and the back 
porch stuccoed, over a period of several years, and 
that Mr. Christy, in the presence of Mrs. Christy 
had agreed that it was not the style to put front 
porches on apartment houses and had '' s.anctioned'' 
the placing of lumber on the back porch in lieu of 
stucco. (Mr. Guild, Tr. 110-117; Ab. 16-17). (Mrs. 
Guild, Tr. 136-138 ; A b. 21). This was denied by 
Mrs. Christy. (Tr. 167; Ab. 25-26). 
A· plasterer, Parley Powe,ll, testified that about 
one year ago, he had given Mr. Guild an estimate 
on the stuccoing job. (Ab. 22). Here was a sub-
stantial issue of fact on a material matter - one 
of the alleged defaults upon which a. claim of for-
feiture was based. It is well· settled that a require-
ment of a written contract may be orally waived. 
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The Supren1e Court of Utah held in the case of 
Hogan Y. s"~ayze, 65 Utah 380; 23'7 P. 1097, 
that a written contract required under the statute 
of frauds to be in "~riting may be n1odified and 
specific provisions 'Yaived by oral agreen1ent. This 
case is directly in point, both on the facts and the 
law. See cases from other jurisdictions collected: 
66 C. J. 7~6, Note 25. 
The appellants assigned as error the order of the 
trial cour~ sustaining objections to the question: 
''_._-\bout ho,,~ rnuch money did you spend 
on making the improvements on the in-
f?jd?? ,, 
The court also sustained objections to the follow-
ing question: 
''I will ask you to state whether or not an 
offer to make accruing installment pay-
ments on the contract was made, and if so, 
what the offer was~" (Assign. I, II). 
The trial court failed to consider equitable issues 
presented by the pleadings, and the rulings com-
plained of were consistent with that position. Tlie 
Supreme Court of Utah has held that in actions for 
the forfeiture of a real estate contract, the ·court 
should determine \\'hether, upon the forfeiture of 
a ·contract, it will impose a penalty. If, under the 
circumstances of the p·articular case, the forfeiture 
results in a penalty, it has been held the forfeiture 
provisions would not be enforced. 
Croft v. Jensen, 86 lJtah 13; 40 P. 19.11) 
198 
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In this ·ca.se if forfeiture of the: contract is per· 
mitted it will impose a penalty. The sellers 11ut 
only got more than one-third of the principal and 
all the interest, but were enriched by the improve-
ments. 
·rhe defendants offered to prove that the house haq 
been remodeled on the inside and that the reason-
able value of the improvements was $2,0~. The 
evidence shows that payments aggregating $1647.67 
had been made. Thus the plaintiffs had put into 
the property $3647.67 in improvements and in 
money. paid. Of the money paid, approximately 
$1153.00 ~vas credited to principal. The total pur-
ehase price of the property 'vas $3200. The trial 
court ignored these facts. It declared a forfeiture 
for failure to p-ay a single monthly payment. The 
evidence shows under the plaintiffs' theory only 
$160 was due ·on the installments on the contract 
on the date the notice of forfeiture 'vas served. 
The notice called for only $130, and not any a.ccru· 
ing installments, and accordingly, $130 w~s ten-
dered. The note, Exhibit 2, provided for monthly 
payments of $35 per month, commencing on the 
] 2th day of December, 1939. Ed,vard L. Guild tes-
tified that he paid $95 on the note, Exhibit 2. This 
would have paid the December payment, the Jan· 
nary payment, and $25 on the February payment. 
There is no provision in the note to the effect that 
upon default the real estate contract may be for-
feited. Even if the-re had been such an agreement 
H t the time the notice vvas served, there 'vas only 
one full payment, (Ap·ril 12) and $10 on the ~larch 
payment due. Certainly a court of equity should 
not direct the forfeiture nf a contract upon which 
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more~ than one-third of the princip1al had been paid 
and ,, .. here $2000 in improven1ents had been n1ade, 
for such slig-ht defaults. 
The California case of 
·\Yebber v. Herbert, 46 Cal. ... ~pp. 8±; 188 
P. 819, 
is closely in point. In that case the purchasers had 
paid $2000 of a $4000 purchase price and they there-
afte·r became delinquent in the payment of inter-
est. The sellers promptly took advantage of the 
default and declared a forfeiture. The trial court 
ruled that because of equitable considerations the 
forfeiture could not be claimed and the Appellate 
Court not only sustained the trial court, but ordered 
the appel~ants to pay to the respondents the sum 
oi $:2~0 as a penalty for a frivolous appeal. The 
.Court said: 
"Such a sillt is addressed to the equitable 
powers of the court. Equity has always 
looked .with marked abhorrence upon for-
feitures, and it has been said many iimes 
that any unquestioned evidence of sharp 
practices and over-reaching is sufficient to 
defeat a complainant in equity who has 
been guilty of such practices. Neither seri-
ous consideration nor citation of authority 
is necessary to support the conclusion that 
no party to a contract can insist on thP-
performance of a current condition, such as 
the payment of taxes, and thereafter re-
pudiate the contract for a prior breach of 
'vhich he must have kno,vn. . A court of 
equity doPs not permit parties 'vho seek 
j t,.:: nid thus to blo'v hot and cold. Neither 
mny a sel1cr for years disregard ~ -provision 
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making time of the essence of a contract, 
litte by little getting half the value of his 
land, and then, without notice to the buyer 
who has been lulled to a false sense of 
seeurity, enforce a forfeiture for a trifling 
delay in the payment of interest. (Cases 
eited).'' 
The only sign of equitable consideration given by 
the court may be found in the court's staten1ent 
on pages 28 to 30 of the abstract. The court said 
that if the defendants would pay the total amount 
due on the contract and in addition, $300 attorney's 
fees, and $35 in .costs, within one week's time, he 
would hold up the entry of a judgment. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that in ac· 
tions of this kind th(\ ~ellRrs cannot recover an 
attorney's fee. 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137; 292 P. 206. 
Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417; 34 P. (2d) 
699. 
Yet the trial court not· only refused to let the pur-
chasers pay up the defaults or even the entire bal-
ance due on the contract, but added a penalty of 
$300 attorney's fees. Under the present business 
conditions such a proposal could not be ·complied 
'vith in the time given. It was stated to the court 
that the defendants had been able to raise all but 
''maybe a hundred or $200 of the amount due.'; 
But the court nevertheless directed a verdict for 
the plaintiffs and entered a judgment for restitu-
tion of the premises and for treble da1nages, which 
aggregated $412.50. Thus, although the documen-
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ta.ry eYidence sho"·s that the defendants _paid n1ore 
than OIH:•-third of the principal an1ount dtte on a 
$3200 purehase price, and the defendants offered to 
proYe that an old building had been turned into an 
apartment house at the cost of $2000, thus putting 
the property in a condition where it 'vould net 
$75 a month, the ·court entered a j·udgment for 
$412.50 damages. This loss of the payment and 
investment, 'Yas an unjust and unconscionable p~en­
alty imposed upon the defendants. 
lt is respectft~lly submitted that the judgment should 
be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted. 
J.D. SKEEN, 
E. J. SKEEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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